From Verisign's Appellate Brief:

"The Supporting Organizations and Constituency Groups of ICANN that engaged in the restraints of trade alleged in the FAC [First Amended Complaint] were substantially controlled by existing and potential competitors of Verisign and others sharing similar economic interests with Verisign's competitors. ICANN has expressly admitted (as quoted in the FAC) in other proceedings that this bottom-up policy making process is subject to control or 'capture' by small groups of competitive interests. According to ICANN, an important reason that its processes are subject to capture is that competitors may have strong interests directly affected by particular actions of ICANN, while other members of ICANN's Constituency Groups generally are part time volunteers, are not directly affected by such actions, and/or lack the time or resources fully to participate in ICANN's processes, therefore not attending meetings or voting on issues presented to Constituency Groups. The result, according to ICANN, is that a small number of highly motivated competitors may control the actions and decisions of ICANN's Supporting Organizations and this its Board."

The "proof" for these allegations is supposedly Paragraphs 84-87 of Verisign's First Amended Complaint. The problem is that all of the allegations, including those attributed to ICANN itself, reference the pre-Reform ICANN of 1998-2002. The Reform process, in which these statements were made and which precedes the decisions at issue, was designed to correct these perceived deficiencies.